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INTRODUCTION 
Before the financial crisis in 1997, Indonesia was believed to be a potential country for its 
phenomenal economic growth and economic miracle, it was considered as one of the promising 
countries in Southeast Asia. Indonesia was generally perceived as having a great potential economic 
future as well as a fascinating market for other producer countries. However, Indonesia’s rapid 
economic growth was criticized by some as having been built upon the government’s over-active role. 
This condition is considered to be over-regulation of business whether big or small, the ownership of 
giant state enterprises, and the support of the crony capitalism. These policies were found in 
government-granted import and trading monopolies and favored access to government contract and 
State bank credit. It is often stated that economic development during this period was heavily affected 
by corruption and rent seeking behavior1
To end the economic crisis Indonesian enacted Law No.5 Year 1999 about Concerning the 
Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition.   The KPPU as a 
commission on supervision of business competition, which is responsible for enforcing and defining 
the substance of sanctions and penalties for violations of the law, was also established. This policy then 
became a significant movement in increasing national and international competition.  
. 
During the enactment and development there are many critiques and problems toward this policy. 
Hence it is necessary for Indonesia to learn from its own experiences by considering various factors 
such as the economic system, the legal and political structures, which will improve the implementation2
The other reason is that Japan and Indonesia has more than 50 years partnership
. 
Besides that, Indonesia should also consider the experience of implementing Antimonopoly law from 
other countries, especially a country which is having strong economic partnership with Indonesia. In 
this paper, the experience of Japan and its antimonopoly act is chosen for several reasons: the Japanese 
antimonopoly was enacted in Japan in 1947. When comparing with the competition laws of the world, 
it was a very early phenomenon. However, like Indonesia, in the beginning antimonopoly policy in 
Japan did not function smoothly, there were many obstacles faced by Japan in enforcement competition 
law and policy in the earlier stage of its establishment. Although the Japanese antimonopoly was 
modeled after the American antitrust law, it changed uniquely according to its major amendments and 
developments of case law.  
3 particularly 
in economic sectors, Japan is a country considered as one of the biggest investors in Indonesia, and 
very influencing in Indonesia business environment.   
 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT AND CHALLENGES (KURNIATY) 
 
 
 
1.  A SKETCHY HISTORY OF ANTIMONOPOLY IN INDONESIA 
１-１Prior to Asian Economic Crisis 
In the past, several Indonesian regulations have attempted to promote fair business 
competition. It can be seen in the provision appeared in several laws, such as Article 382 of the 
Indonesian Criminal Code, article 1365 of the Civil Code, and other regulation. In spite of this, the 
provision could provide protection to business persons only if the unfair competition in question is 
caused as a result of a deceptive act. This provision was clearly inadequate, since unfair competition, 
activities such as market restrictions, and collusions were not necessarily conducted through deception, 
thus it can be said that the application of the provision was limited.  
The unlawful action in Indonesia was not clearly defined, and so its application is very 
extensive. Even worse, the judges thought that it was not necessary to have a standard definition. As a 
result, the application of provisions regarding unlawful activities on business competition was very 
limited and rested solely on the judges’ discretion when a case arises. This clearly presented problems 
for business persons intending to plan their activities in advance4
The other regulations are Law Number 5 of 1984 on Industry, and article 7 and 104 of Law 
Number 1 of 1995 on Companies, all of which limit the possibility of monopolistic practices through 
mergers. However, it turned out that these stipulations were so universal and simple, that they were 
ineffective to restrict business player from practicing unfair trade.
. 
5
In the mid-1980s the idea of formulating a comprehensive policy regarding business 
competition eventually appeared, but it was soon abandoned and forgotten. Although a lot of efforts 
were made by the government for the purpose of drafting the business competition law, little was 
actually achieved. In 1992, the research division of Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), one of big 
parties in Indonesia, prepared a draft bill entitled Simulation of Economic Competition Law, but for 
various reasons the government did not take the bill into consideration
 
6
    
. 
1-2 The Momentum: Establishing Antimonopoly Policy 
When the financial crisis revealed that Indonesia lacked sound policy for determining what 
constitutes fair and unfair business competition, the government realized that Indonesia also lacked any 
mechanism for systematically dealing with business actors whose practices go against the principles of 
free and fair competition7. In order to solve the crisis the government of Indonesia signed Letter of 
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Intent (LOI) as part an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan-rescue program in January 1998. 
Among the fifty points outlined in the accompanying Memorandum of Understanding, the Indonesian 
government undertook a program of government deregulation. The government’s plans for deregulation 
were incorporated in Seven Presidential Degrees, three Government Degrees, and six Presidential 
Instructions 8
 
. Part of the IMF-ordered deregulation prohibits the Indonesian government from 
protecting the “cronies” that cause marked distortions. As part of the commitment stated in the LOI, the 
Government of Indonesia agreed to enact a law to ensure free and fair business competition, which 
resulted in the Law Number 5 Years 1999 that came into effect in March 2000. As in other countries 
with competition laws, Indonesia has adopted the notion that competition law is a means to preserve 
and maintain a competitive economy that will encourage efficiency and increase consumer welfare.  
１-3 Legal Frameworks and Enforcement Body  
The current Indonesian antimonopoly regulation stipulates general provisions, principles and 
objectives, prohibited agreements, prohibited activities, dominant position, business competition 
supervisory board (KPPU), case handling procedures, sanctions, miscellaneous provisions, transitional 
provisions, and closing provisions. The general provisions contain the operational definitions used in 
the law, for example, the definition of monopoly, market, and relevant market, centralization of 
economic power, agreement, and conspiracy.  
The objectives of the law include: safeguarding the public interest; improving the efficiency of 
the national economy as a means of improving the people’s welfare; creating effectiveness and 
efficiency in business operations; providing equal business opportunities to small, medium and large 
scale businesses; and preventing monopolistic practices and unfair business practices. 
KPPU was officially established by the Presidential Decree No. 75 of 1999, dated July 8, 19999, 
and the commissioners were appointed by the Presidential Decree No. 162/M of 2000, dated June 7, 
2000. The Commission consists of eleven members from different backgrounds of expertise appointed 
to serve for a period of five years10. The KPPU is designed to be an independent agency that is free 
from government control and interference11. In order to assure its independent position, commission 
members are appointed or dismissed by the President upon approval of the House of Representatives 
and are obliged to make reports to the President and the House of Representatives12
.  
.  
The KPPU has a wide range of duties and authorities, it may investigate alleged violations of the 
law based on a written complaint or upon its own initiative13. Likewise, KPPU has a wide range of 
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powers, including conducting investigation, evaluating alleged violation, issuing decisions, imposing 
administrative sanctions, and providing advice and opinion on government policies related to 
anti-competitive conducts.  
In relation to the proceedings, any person who is aware of or is harmed by the violation may 
submit a written report to the Commission14. Based on such report, the Commission is required to 
conduct a preliminary examination, advanced examination, and to decide whether or not there has been 
a violation of the law. Concerning sanctions, the Commission has the authority to impose sanctions in 
the form of administrative measures on business actors violating the provisions of the Law 15
 
. 
Administrative measures involve agreement cancellation, instruction to business actors to terminate 
vertical integration, instruction to halt activities evidently resulting in monopolistic practices and or 
unfair business competition and or harmful for the community. Administrative measures may also be in 
the form of instruction to business actors not to abuse dominant position, cancellation of merger or 
amalgamation of business entities and share acquisition, compensation payment, and imposition of a 
fine of not less than Rp.1 billion and not more than Rp.25 billion. 
2.  JAPANESE ANTIMONOPOLY POLICY:  
CHANGES AND CONTINUITY 
 
2-1 History and Development 
In Japan, the aim of the antimonopoly law or “Law Concerning Prohibition of Private 
Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade” (Law No.54 of 1947) is to promote free and fair 
competition in market, thus stimulating the creative initiative of entrepreneurs and ensuring the 
protection of the interests of consumers in general. At the first establishment, this policy was expected 
to develop and be operated in the same ways as the American antitrust law. However, it turned out 
incompatible with the real operation of the Japanese economy and difficult economic situation after the 
Second World War. Consequently, it was revised extensively in 1953 to introduce several exceptions to 
the prohibition of cartels and allows some collaboration among competitors with regards to such things 
as researching and developing new technology (R&D) that was banned at the beginning. The 
development and changes of Japanese antimonopoly can be divided into periods from pre-world war to 
2009. 
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Pre-World War II 
In this era, free competition was a new idea in the Japanese business community. After the 
Meiji restoration of 1868, the basic objectives of the Japanese government and industries were to learn 
from and reach industrial equality with Western countries. Hence, to achieve these objectives, the 
Japanese government undertook intensive program of industrial development, such as the steel industry 
in which nationalized steel mills were launched.  
The Economic Democratization Policy 
Complete damage of Japan and its industries was seen in Japan at the end of the Second World 
War. Japan was occupied by the Allied Occupation Forces in which the United State was the leading 
power. The Occupation Forces promoted reconstruction of the Japanese economy on the basis of 
economy democracy through the introduction of an “economic democratization policy”16
1. Agricultural land reform 
, which 
consisted of three major parts:  
2. Labor legislation 
3. The decentralization program and enactment of the Antimonopoly law 
 
The important part of the Economic Democratization Policy at that time was breaking up the 
zaibatsu and enacting the Antimonopoly law. The zaibatsu exercised incredible power over the entire 
Japanese economy until the end of the Second World War. The Occupation Forces decided to eliminate 
the zaibatsu and issued a series of memoranda to the Japanese government ordering that they be 
dissolved. The Japanese government enacted the Law to eliminate Excessive Concentration of 
Economic Power and issued a series of decrees. Under this law, many large companies in zaibatsu were 
split into many small entities. As a result, the decentralization of the Japanese economy was 
accomplished.  
The Origin of Japanese Antimonopoly 
The original model of Antimonopoly of Japan is American antitrust law that is the Sherman Act, 
the Clayton Act, and the Federal Commission Trade Acts, which gave several unique characteristics to 
the Japanese Antimonopoly legislative when compared with present legislation. It was a strong piece of 
legislation in several ways: the law (1) applied a per se illegal standard for cartels, (2) imposed strict 
control over mergers and acquisition, (3) prohibited unreasonable disparity in terms of economic power 
among enterprises, and (4) severely limited exemptions. Incidentally this legislation created the Japan 
Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) to enforce the statute. 
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The policy was strictly enforced for the first few years of its enactment because the 
overwhelming power of the Occupation Forces. From around 1950, however, enforcement was quite 
suddenly lessened as a result of the Truman Doctrine17 and the Korean War.18
The 1953 Amendment 
Then United States 
policy changed from discouraging Japan’s recovery as a major economic power to rebuilding Japan 
into a heavily industrialized country that is able to function as a protection against communism.  
In 1953 the Japanese antimonopoly was amended, and major provisions of the act were reduced. 
The amendment consists of: Firtsly, the per se prohibition of cartels was changed to the prohibition of 
cartels if they substantially restraint competition contrary to the public interest. Secondly, the strict 
regulation of mergers and acquisitions was also relaxed. Thirdly, the prohibition of undue gaps in 
economic power among enterprises was eliminated. Fourth, cartels during economic depression and 
those for rationalization were exempted from the prohibition under defined conditions. Fifth, resale 
price maintenance was also conditionally exempted. Finally, the provisions dealing with unfair 
business practice were amended.  
Besides, the liberalization of capital transaction took place around this period. This was 
accomplished through the relaxation and essential elimination of the Foreign Investment Law. When 
this law was fully enforced, international agreements involving technology licensing were closely 
analyzed, and if the provisions of an agreement were considered to constitute an unfair business 
practice, the obligatory government approval under this law would not be granted unless the offending 
provisions were deleted19
The Oil Crisis and the 1977 Amendment 
. 
The oil crisis in 1977 brought new era in the enforcement, hidden cartels, created by the 
petroleum industry with the purpose of fixing price, were discovered and public protest developed 
concerning the price manipulations of private industry. A task force was organized by the JFTC to study 
the possibility of an amendment, and certain proposals were made with the aim of making the law more 
effective against economic concentration. The government took up the issue, and amendment was made 
in 197720
There are three major changes of the amendment
.  
21; first one was the incorporation of a 
provision to control monopolistic conditions in the market. Secondly, the administrative fine, may be 
imposed when price cartel fixed prices by collusion. The JFTC is empowered to order the participants 
in the cartels to pay an administrative fine in order to deprive such participants of excess profit 
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resulting from the cartel. The last is the price reporting system. When in an oligopolistic market, major 
companies raise price simultaneously, the JFTC can order such companies to provide the JFTC with 
reasons justifying the price increase.  
2005 Amendment  
In 2005, the regulation was amended to make enforcement of the Act more effective, purposed 
primarily to strengthen the regulation of cartels. As a result the scale of the power given to the JFTC is 
said to be the most in the Japanese Antitrust law history. Due to the amendment, the antitrust 
regulations of cartels have become significantly stricter, and the JFTC was given the power to exercise 
its authority to concentrate effort on cartels much more aggressively.  
Regarding these amendments, three reforms in particular should be noted. The first, the JFTC is 
now able to exercise compulsory measure to investigate possible antitrust violation for which criminal 
sanction is imposed. The second, the amount of surcharge applicable to cartels has been increased. And 
the last, the Leniency Program has been introduced.  
2009 Amendment  
The newest revision of antimonopoly law was made in 2009, and it came into effect on January 
2010, to follow up on major revision in 2009 and to reinforce the existing surcharge rules22
A number of other revisions have also been made in the surcharge system. These include the 
imposition of higher surcharge rates on businesses that have played a leading role in cartels and 
bid-riggings; joint application for leniency by multiple numbers of enterprises belonging to the same 
corporate group; increase in the number of enterprises that can apply for leniency in a single 
infringement case; and extension of the statute of limitations for the issuance of surcharge payment 
orders
.The main 
features of the most recent amendment are: the scope of violations subject to surcharges has been 
expanded to include exclusionary types of private monopolization and the abuse of dominant 
bargaining position. Furthermore, surcharges will also be applicable to sales at unjustly low prices, 
discriminatory pricing, concerted refusal to trade, and restriction of resale price on and after the second 
offense of the same type of infringement within a ten-year period.  
23
 
. 
2-2 The Structure, Substantive Rules, and Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) 
Generally, Japanese antimonopoly law prohibits a business from: preventing free and fair 
competition by consulting with other entrepreneurs (the cartel regulation), unjustly maintaining its 
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monopolistic position or excluding other competitors (the monopoly regulation), Distorting 
competition by using any of the sixteen types of unfair trade practices (the Unfair trade regulation), 
Beside that the substantive rules about market concentration (the merger regulation) is also provided. 
The conduct dealt with by the cartel regulation provisions is described as `unreasonable 
restraint of trade` which means to mutually restrict business activities by making cooperative decision 
concerning sales price, sales volume, consolidating of manufacturing facilities, and restriction of 
business partners among competitors, thereby substantially restricting competition in any field of trade. 
Unreasonable restraint of trade includes conduct such as `bid rigging`, `price cartelization`, `market 
segmentation cartelization`, transaction term cartelization`, `supply restriction cartelization`, `trading 
partner restriction cartelization`, and others. 
The conduct set out in the monopoly regulation is called `private monopolization`, which 
means that entrepreneurs exclude or control the business activities or other entrepreneurs, thereby 
causing, contrary to the public interest, a substantial restraint of competition in any particular field of 
trade. Specifically, this means any conduct by an company with large market share that seek to exclude 
the participation of new entrants or restrain the business activities of other competitors by using unjust 
means (in many cases, but not limited to, any means that violate the act) in order to maintain market 
share. 
Further, the enforcement body or Japan fair trade commission (JFTC) was initially instituted 
in 1947 as an administrative agency of the central government set up in order to fulfill the objectives of 
Japanese antimonopoly. JFTC’s characteristic is an independent administrative commission. Due to its 
role as the basic controller on economic activity, the principle needs to be implemented in a continuous 
and consistent manner under the control of a neutral and fair agency without any political influence. 
That is why, unlike other administrative agencies, JFTC exercises its power independently without the 
direction/supervision of a higher organ of government. This function is performed not by ad hoc 
appointment, but rather by a commission because the application of antimonopoly policy as the basic 
rules on economic activity must be prudently examined.  
Regarding administrative procedures, after preliminary investigation, if the JFTC find a 
reasonable ground, it may initiate a formal investigation. After a formal investigation, if the JFTC does 
not find a violation, it closes the case. On the other hand, if the JFTC find a violation, it issues an 
elimination orders and/or a surcharge order after having provided the respondent with an opportunity to 
submit its opinion, etc. and initiate formal hearings upon the filling of the written request when these 
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resulting from the cartel. The last is the price reporting system. When in an oligopolistic market, major 
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.The main 
features of the most recent amendment are: the scope of violations subject to surcharges has been 
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23
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monopolistic position or excluding other competitors (the monopoly regulation), Distorting 
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in 1947 as an administrative agency of the central government set up in order to fulfill the objectives of 
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role as the basic controller on economic activity, the principle needs to be implemented in a continuous 
and consistent manner under the control of a neutral and fair agency without any political influence. 
That is why, unlike other administrative agencies, JFTC exercises its power independently without the 
direction/supervision of a higher organ of government. This function is performed not by ad hoc 
appointment, but rather by a commission because the application of antimonopoly policy as the basic 
rules on economic activity must be prudently examined.  
Regarding administrative procedures, after preliminary investigation, if the JFTC find a 
reasonable ground, it may initiate a formal investigation. After a formal investigation, if the JFTC does 
not find a violation, it closes the case. On the other hand, if the JFTC find a violation, it issues an 
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orders are objected to by the firm.  If the JFTC finds that a violation exists at the end of formal 
proceedings, the JFTC issues the formal decision ordering the respondent firm to take corrective 
measures. 
If dissatisfied with the judgment of the JFTC, the relevant parties may file litigation at the 
Tokyo High Court that has exclusive jurisdiction in seeking the revocation of the judgment of JFTC. 
The relevant parties may plead to introduce new evidence, mentioned that there are reasonable grounds. 
The relevant parties may also file an appeal against the Tokyo High Court with the Supreme Court for 
its review. 
  
3.  THE FEATURES, FUTURE CHALLENGES, AND LESSONS LEARNED 
3-1 The Features and Challenges of Indonesian Antimonopoly Law 
Article 3 of Indonesian antimonopoly regulation cites four items as the purposes of the law, but 
no unifying concept free and fair competition at least explicitly, there are many ambiguous provisions. 
The vagueness of these provisions has raised various criticisms and comments. This article contains 
several different provisions and has been subject to several different interpretations. As a result the 
basic thrust of the article that is maintaining and promoting competition as a means to achieving 
economic efficiency, has been lost. Many argue that a different interpretation of the provision to 
“maintain equal opportunities for small, medium and large business firms” could suggest market 
segmentation and protection of the rights of different sized firms when the spirit of antimonopoly is to 
ensure competitive markets no matter how large firms are.  
In addition, several articles spell out the maximum market shares for monopolies, 
monopsonies, oligopolies and oligopsonies that would trigger action by the Commission. Another 
provision prohibits the acquisition of a competitor’s stock if it results in a market share of the firms 
together that is too large. These two provisions suggest that there is an overarching concern with the 
size of large firms rather than whether they are involved in unfair business practices. These provisions 
also seem to suggest that “Big is bad” based on prima facia evidence of the size of firms.  
There are many specific provisions on prohibited agreements in Indonesian antimonopoly law: 
In total, 12 provisions prohibit 16 specific types of agreements including horizontal ones and vertical 
ones24. Among those 16 types, 7 types such as one regarding horizontal price fixing agreement are 
provided for as per se illegal and 9 types such as minimum resale price maintenance agreement as rule 
of reason.25
Furthermore, independent enforcement agency which is the sole enforcement agency of 
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Indonesian competition law and policy was instituted. It is a so called "independent administrative 
commission". It is free from the government and other party's influence and authority and is 
responsible to the president (article 30). The term of office of any member is 5 years (article 31). The 
Commission is assisted by a secretariat (article 34). One of the causes for the termination of the 
membership is "dismissal".26
Regarding the court system, legal enforcement of decision by KPPU is an issue that is still 
being reviewed. KPPU encountered resistance from the business and other legal enforcers who are 
unfamiliar with the regulation
The President has the power to appoint and dismiss all the members of 
KPPU, including a chairperson and a deputy chairperson. Therefore, KPPU may not be completely free 
from the influence of the President. 
27. This is mainly due to KPPU broad authority, which includes 
investigation, adjudication and sanctions to the Reported Party who have proved violating the law28. 
KPPU can impose administrative sanctions against the violators29 and may seek criminal penalties for 
certain violations as stipulated under Article 48. Through various debates, prosecutors and police have 
raised questions concerning criminal sanctions on their role as part of the enforcement process. At 
present the Court and KPPU concluded that the role of the police and or prosecutors may involve in the 
process if KPPU found that there is criminal violation exists30. The principle seems concrete but the 
execution process or procedure remains unclear. Several substantive and procedural issues have been 
challenged during the enforcement process. Debates continued when reported party challenged KPPU 
sanctions as authorized by the law. Appeal may be brought to the District Court by the Reported Party 
or when KPPU or the Reported Party decided to challenge District Court verdict to the Supreme Court 
(kasasi). The procedure applies HIR (Herzien Indonesische Reglement)31 as the formal ground for 
procedure.32
Several sectors are exempt from the provision of law. Many argue that it has broad exemption 
provisions such as mentioned art.5 (2). Those exceptions include intellectual property and small-scale 
enterprise (SMEs). The justification for this exemption is to give SMEs some protection against the 
predatory actions of large firms as well as to maintain a diverse distribution of firm of different sizes 
with different skill requirements. On the contrary, some argue that the exemption of small scale 
enterprises will not enhance their competition advantage relative to larger scale enterprises
 
33
There is a dynamic tension between protection of intellectual property and the enforcement of 
competition. Protection of intellectual property protects and preserves the incentives for innovation 
since firms are more likely to innovate if they are protected from free riders. On the other hand, 
. 
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continued protection can lead to the development of monopolistic power if these rights are not flexible 
enough to respond to new innovations and ideas. In the case of Indonesia much of the protection of 
intellectual property involves infringement of the rights of foreign firms. 
In addition, another challenge is a very strict procedural time constraints on KPPU (art. 43 (1) 
and (2)). The Commission shall be obligated to complete further investigations within a maximum 
period of 60 (sixty) days counted from the date of investigation as referred to under article 39, 
Paragraph (1). If it is deemed necessary, the period of investigation as referred to under Paragraph (1) 
the process may be extended at the longest within a period of 30 (thirty) days. The District Court must 
make a decision within a period of 30 (thirty) days counted from the date the objection begins to be 
examined, and article 45(4) The Supreme Court must make a decision within a period of 30 (thirty) 
days counted from the date the cassation petition is received. 
 
3-2 The Features of the Japanese Antimonopoly Act 
Logical consistency while keeping elasticity is considered one of the characteristic of Japanese 
antimonopoly arrangement34
The Japanese antimonopoly act provides that unfair trade practices shall be such conducts as 
JFTC designates as unfair trade practices out of the conducts which meet the above two requirements. 
Therefore, what are unfair trade practices are determined by JFTC's designation. In order to regulate 
unfair trade practices effectively in a specific area, two special laws have been enacted. One is 
Subcontract Law and another is Premiums and Representations Law.  
. This characteristic can be seen in unifying concept “Free and Fair 
Competition” under the article 1. The regulation also sets 6 broad patterns of conducts as a framework 
of unfair trade practices. They are: unjust discrimination, unjust pricing, unjust customer inducement 
and transaction coercion, unjust binding terms dealing, abuse of trade dominance, and unjust trade 
hindrance and internal disturbance of a company. 
The regulation of “trade dominance"35
Regarding the independent enforcement agency, JFTC is the sole enforcement agency of 
Japanese competition law. All of commissioners are appointed by the prime minister with the assent of 
the Diet. JFTC has a strong independence of functions. Even Prime Minister can’t instruct JFTC. It has 
 abuse can be categorized as unique. Trade dominance is 
where one transacting party is dominant over other transacting party, while market dominance is where 
one or a group of entrepreneurs is dominating over a relevant market. Trade dominance situation is 
found in a continuous trade relationship such as subcontract, supplying goods to a large retailer, 
newspaper publisher vs. newspaper retail distributor.  
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also heavy protection of status36. JFTC has a wide range of powers. It has investigative power, 
adjudicative power, enactment power, policy making power, advocacy power and research power on 
competition law and policy37. In addition, General Secretariat is attached to JFTC38
As much as 18 guidelines in addition to 13 on unfair trade practices have been issued in order to 
increase transparency, clarity and foreseeing ability of law and to promote self- compliance. The 
Japanese antimonopoly law also has several categories of corrective measures against violations: 
administrative measures (they are elimination measure order by JFTC
. It is the source of 
expertise and efficiency in competition policy.  
39 and surcharge payment order 
by JFTC against price cartel, volume cartel, market share cartel, customer restriction cartel and control 
type private monopolization40. Also criminal measures that imprisonment up to 3 years against natural 
persons, criminal fine up to 500 million yen against entrepreneurs and up to 5 million yen against 
natural persons regarding certain gross violations such as cartels 41 and the private enforcement 
measures that including damage suits, injunction suits (against unfair trade practices )42
In Japan the alleged entrepreneur who are dissatisfied with an elimination measure order or 
surcharge payment order may request a hearing proceeding on the case. This hearing proceeding is very 
similar to court proceeding. It is the full trial on the matters of fact and law. The alleged entrepreneur 
has full opportunity to submit assertions and evidences and to carry out cross examinations of 
witnesses with assistance of his attorney. The hearing proceeding is held under triangle structure 
consisting of investigator, alleged entrepreneur and trial examiner.  
. 
Additionally, concerning centralized court review system, an entrepreneur who complaints 
against JFTC's decision issued at the final stage of the hearing proceeding may bring a suit requesting 
cancellation of such decision to Tokyo High Court. The reason for this jurisdiction is for having unified 
court decision on competition law cases. Such court review is not a de novo trial but an examination of 
whether or not JFTC’s decision is based on “substantial evidences”, where substantial evidences have 
been interpreted to be those evidences based on which a reasonable person reaches the same 
conclusion43
 
. 
3-3 Valuable Lesson from Japanese Experience 
From the two characteristic above for Indonesian and Japanese antimonopoly policy, this 
section will discuss lessons which may be learned from the Japanese experience. The following are the 
result of my consideration: 
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Introduction of unifying concept “ Free and Fair Competition “:  This concept is very useful to 
have the interpretation and enforcement of the competition law focus on the right targets while keeping 
coordination and integrity. Four items as the objective is cited in Indonesian antimonopoly law but no 
unifying concept “Free and Fair Competition”. The mentioned four purposes may sometimes conflict 
with other44
Clarification of the definition of “monopolistic practices“ is necessary because it plays an 
important role. It works as the standard to determine the illegality of 13 types out of 31 types of 
prohibited conducts in total. The problem of antimonopoly arrangement in Indonesia is that people find 
difficulty to understand what is prohibited in practice. The related provisions to monopolistic practices 
are defined in the article 1. Therefore, it seems necessary to clarify definition of monopolistic practices 
by reasonable interpretation or preferably by amendment of the law. 
. The importance of promoting free and fair competition has been increasing under progress 
of economic globalization. National economy which can prosper under globalization can be fostered 
only through promotion of domestic active free and fair competition. So, the present objectives may be 
interpreted or preferably amended by changing the items order and inserting the new item “to promote 
free and fair competition".   
Definition or clarification of unfair business competition also important because it works as the 
standard to determine the illegality of 20 types out of 31 types of prohibited conduct in total. The 
problem is that the present definition of unfair business competition is too simple. Only a few clues to 
the patterns of conduct and degree of restraint of competition can be drawn from the definition45
There are many dilemmas regarding to exemption. As a result, it seems necessary to have them 
reviewed and more finetuned. Otherwise most of the effect of the policy may be lost. What conduct, in 
what manner and for what purpose is exempted and the case where exemption is denied or cancelled 
should be prescribed. Where the exemption is based on the existing laws, the relevant article of such 
law should be clearly stipulated.  
. 
Enrichment of the definition of “unfair business competition” is considered essential for the 
development of antimonopoly law. In practice KPPU can attain purposes mentioned above by utilizing 
its guideline issuing authority. Introduction of unfair business competition designation system by 
KPPU will increase elasticity and quickness to cope with the rapidly changing economic conditions and 
business actors conducts. Such system will provide KPPU with the measures to meet the sense of local 
justice, thereby to get support for competition law and policy from consumers and SMEs. 
As mentioned above, KPPU is obligated to complete a follow-up investigation within 90 days.  
The district court must make a decision within 30 days from the commencement of the hearing, and the 
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Supreme Court must make a decision within 30 days from the time the appeal is received. This 
mentioned time constraints are too strict to follow for a very difficult and complicated case46
Also introduction of centralized court review system is critically important because the concept 
of “Free and Fair Competition” is new in Indonesian judicature and it needs expertise to deliver a 
reasonable decision on competition law violation cases. Under the circumstances, one of the measures 
to attain reasonable and unified court decisions on appeal cases against KPPU's decisions may be 
introduction of centralized court review system. In Japan, an entrepreneur who complaints against 
JFTC's decision issued at the final stage of the hearing proceeding may bring a suit requesting 
cancellation of such decision to Tokyo High Court.  
. If it is 
interpreted as binding one in a sense that the procedure is null and void when this time constraint is not 
kept (for example, KPPU can't issue a decision when it can't complete the follow-up investigation 
within 90 days.), the practical effects of such time constraint may strengthen the tendency that only 
easy cases are eliminated while difficult and complicated cases are left untouched. Hence, better choice 
may be by amendment to set more reasonable and practical endeavor targets such as 6 months for 
KPPU follow-up investigations and 3 months for local court and the Supreme Court decisions.  
Indonesia has already adopted such special court system as commercial court, which deals with 
commercial cases including bankruptcy and a decision of which is appealed directly to the Supreme 
Court47
 
. Besides, publication of court decisions will bring good effects such as effective accumulation 
of enforcement experiences, increase of clarity on what prohibited, as a material for research on better 
enforcement and better law, and finally, it will prevent the corruption. 
Conclusion 
In market economy, antimonopoly policy plays important role for economic developments well 
as economic growth, and especially for Indonesia, which is still struggling to overcome its economic 
and political condition. However, when a regulation of one country has too many purposes or even 
conflicting purposes, the law is not as effective as it could be. Various interpretations lead to 
inconsistency in the enforcement or the application.  
Although Indonesian competition law has many provisions that could lead to various 
interpretations and approaches, this is only the beginning of the process to understand the new concept 
of competing with the support of the legal tools. The commission, judges, and prosecutors face pressure 
to try to interpret the law, sometimes conflicting goals of fairness, economic efficiency, and protecting 
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interpreted or preferably amended by changing the items order and inserting the new item “to promote 
free and fair competition".   
Definition or clarification of unfair business competition also important because it works as the 
standard to determine the illegality of 20 types out of 31 types of prohibited conduct in total. The 
problem is that the present definition of unfair business competition is too simple. Only a few clues to 
the patterns of conduct and degree of restraint of competition can be drawn from the definition45
There are many dilemmas regarding to exemption. As a result, it seems necessary to have them 
reviewed and more finetuned. Otherwise most of the effect of the policy may be lost. What conduct, in 
what manner and for what purpose is exempted and the case where exemption is denied or cancelled 
should be prescribed. Where the exemption is based on the existing laws, the relevant article of such 
law should be clearly stipulated.  
. 
Enrichment of the definition of “unfair business competition” is considered essential for the 
development of antimonopoly law. In practice KPPU can attain purposes mentioned above by utilizing 
its guideline issuing authority. Introduction of unfair business competition designation system by 
KPPU will increase elasticity and quickness to cope with the rapidly changing economic conditions and 
business actors conducts. Such system will provide KPPU with the measures to meet the sense of local 
justice, thereby to get support for competition law and policy from consumers and SMEs. 
As mentioned above, KPPU is obligated to complete a follow-up investigation within 90 days.  
The district court must make a decision within 30 days from the commencement of the hearing, and the 
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Supreme Court must make a decision within 30 days from the time the appeal is received. This 
mentioned time constraints are too strict to follow for a very difficult and complicated case46
Also introduction of centralized court review system is critically important because the concept 
of “Free and Fair Competition” is new in Indonesian judicature and it needs expertise to deliver a 
reasonable decision on competition law violation cases. Under the circumstances, one of the measures 
to attain reasonable and unified court decisions on appeal cases against KPPU's decisions may be 
introduction of centralized court review system. In Japan, an entrepreneur who complaints against 
JFTC's decision issued at the final stage of the hearing proceeding may bring a suit requesting 
cancellation of such decision to Tokyo High Court.  
. If it is 
interpreted as binding one in a sense that the procedure is null and void when this time constraint is not 
kept (for example, KPPU can't issue a decision when it can't complete the follow-up investigation 
within 90 days.), the practical effects of such time constraint may strengthen the tendency that only 
easy cases are eliminated while difficult and complicated cases are left untouched. Hence, better choice 
may be by amendment to set more reasonable and practical endeavor targets such as 6 months for 
KPPU follow-up investigations and 3 months for local court and the Supreme Court decisions.  
Indonesia has already adopted such special court system as commercial court, which deals with 
commercial cases including bankruptcy and a decision of which is appealed directly to the Supreme 
Court47
 
. Besides, publication of court decisions will bring good effects such as effective accumulation 
of enforcement experiences, increase of clarity on what prohibited, as a material for research on better 
enforcement and better law, and finally, it will prevent the corruption. 
Conclusion 
In market economy, antimonopoly policy plays important role for economic developments well 
as economic growth, and especially for Indonesia, which is still struggling to overcome its economic 
and political condition. However, when a regulation of one country has too many purposes or even 
conflicting purposes, the law is not as effective as it could be. Various interpretations lead to 
inconsistency in the enforcement or the application.  
Although Indonesian competition law has many provisions that could lead to various 
interpretations and approaches, this is only the beginning of the process to understand the new concept 
of competing with the support of the legal tools. The commission, judges, and prosecutors face pressure 
to try to interpret the law, sometimes conflicting goals of fairness, economic efficiency, and protecting 
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of small-medium business, as apparent in their decisions. 
Other major obstacles encountered are the ambiguities, the question of the procedural law 
including the standard of review towards KPPU decisions that are brought to the court through appeal 
process. The Commission and the law enforcers will have to learn from the process by strengthening 
this knowledge, which in the long run will be reflected in their decisions.  
There would be certainly an open alternative to amend the law in the future; however, 
amendment is not the ultimate way for the improvement. Developing a good understanding of the 
concept of competition, economic efficiency and consumer welfare would have to go along with the 
improvement of the procedural law and the ability of the law enforcers. Thus, the experience of Japan 
and its development of competition law and policy such as the clear definition in the provisions and the 
procedures can be great lessons for Indonesia. 
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Graduate School of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University) 
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of small-medium business, as apparent in their decisions. 
Other major obstacles encountered are the ambiguities, the question of the procedural law 
including the standard of review towards KPPU decisions that are brought to the court through appeal 
process. The Commission and the law enforcers will have to learn from the process by strengthening 
this knowledge, which in the long run will be reflected in their decisions.  
There would be certainly an open alternative to amend the law in the future; however, 
amendment is not the ultimate way for the improvement. Developing a good understanding of the 
concept of competition, economic efficiency and consumer welfare would have to go along with the 
improvement of the procedural law and the ability of the law enforcers. Thus, the experience of Japan 
and its development of competition law and policy such as the clear definition in the provisions and the 
procedures can be great lessons for Indonesia. 
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はじめに 
 
 主権国家は、ウェストファリア体制以来、国際社会の最も基本的なアクターであり、近代以
降の国民国家において、その政治体制の正当な担い手は、「国民」とされてきた。そして、国
民国家が成立する歴史的な過程で、「国民」の中核に据えられてきた集団が、ネイションとし
て規定されてきた 1。ネイションが形成される過程では、支配関係において歴史的に優位な地
位を占めてきた集団の文化が普遍化されることによって、政治制度および社会制度が構築され
た。その他のマイノリティ集団は、一方で中心集団が提唱するイデオロギーとしてのナショナ
リズムに包摂され、他方で包摂されない場合には従属的な位置に取り残されることになった2。
つまり、国民国家は必然的にマイノリティの同化と異化を経てきたのである。それゆえ、国民
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